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COMMENTS
FEDERAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST PENDING
STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS: YOUNGER DAYS ARE
HERE AGAIN
Traditionally, a federal equity court may grant a permanent injunc-
tion only upon a showing of irreparable injury and inadequacy of legal
remedies.' Although this formulation of the rule appears to require the
presence of two distinct elements, the two concepts are closely interrelated
and often indistinguishable in application. The inadequacy of legal remedies
to prevent or undo the plaintiff's injury presents a situation in which ir-
reparable injury will occur unless equity intervenes.' Generally, the inade-
quacy of remedjes at law in federal court warrants issuance of an injunc-
tion regardless of whether state courts afford an adequate legal remedy.'
The Civil Rights Act of 1871,' now codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, vests federal courts with the power to enjoin a person acting under
color of state law from depriving a United States citizen or other person
within the nation's jurisdiction of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.' This injunc-
tive power protects not only rights secured under constitutional and
statutory guarantees of equal protection and civil liberty, but also encom-
passes claims based on purely statutory violations of federal law. 6 The
Copyright 1984, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. See Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959); New York Guar.
Co. v. Memphis Water Co., 107 U.S. 205, 214 (1883).
2. See H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 43, at 103 n.22
(2d ed. 1948) ("In equity 'irreparable injury' is an injury of such a nature that the recovery
of monetary damages would not be an adequate remedy."). Another analysis demonstrates
the close interrelationship of the two formulae. This analysis recognizes the "inadequate
remedy at law" rubric as the essential test for permanent injunctive relief and views irreparable
injury as merely the most frequently-used ground for demonstrating the inadequacy of legal
remedies. See Lewis v. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115, 1124 (5th Cir. 1976); 11 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2944, at 399 (1973). However the test is
formulated, the adequacy of the remedy at law entails a minimum threshold of sufficiency
and certainty. Thus, a court may grant an injunction if the legal remedy is not as complete,
practical, and efficient as that available in equity or if the presence of the remedy is doubt-
ful. See, e.g., American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 214 (1937); 11 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra, § 2944, at 396.
3. See Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 69 (1935); McConihay
v. Wright, 121 U.S. 201, 206 (1887).
4. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprevation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
6. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (§ 1983 provides a cause of action for
a state's deprivation of welfare benefits provided for under the federal Social Security Act).
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principle of sovereign immunity embodied in the eleventh amendment'
does not prevent a federal court from enjoining a state official from en-
forcing state law that violates federal law unless that remedy in actuality
could be enforced against only the state.' In particular, the amendment
does not bar a federal injunction that restrains a state official from in-
stituting or prosecuting state judicial proceedings to enforce state law.'
When a federal plaintiff seeks such an injunction, however, a question
necessarily arises as to what extent the availability and adequacy of the
state judicial remedies should affect issuance of the federal injunction.
While suits under section 1983 raise this question more frequently, it will
appear whenever a federal court is empowered to enjoin the commence-
ment or prosecution of state judicial proceedings.
Threatened Judicial Proceedings
In regard to injunctions of threatened criminal prosecutions, the United
States Supreme Court has focused on the adequacy of the defense in the
impending state proceeding, rather than looking solely to the adequacy
of the legal remedies available in federal court. Thus, cases such as Douglas
v. City of Jeannette"' characterize irreparable injury in this context in
terms of "extraordinary circumstances"" which undermine an implicit
assumption that the state proceeding provides an adequate remedy at law.
The federal plaintiff can demonstrate irreparable injury in the face of
impending criminal proceedings only if the threat to his federally pro-
tected rights cannot be eliminated by his defense against the single criminal
prosecution.' 2 Threatened bad faith prosecution that is designed to harass
7. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend.
XI. The Supreme Court has never applied the amendment literally. Rather than trimming
the federal judicial power, the amendment ensures that common law sovereign immunity
is available as a constitutional defense to an action brought against a state in nearly all
of the categories of cases to which the federal judicial power extends. See generally Tribe,
Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers
Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REv. 682 (1976).
8. Compare Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (a suit to enjoin threatened institu-
tion of state criminal proceedings not barred) with Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)
(a suit for equitable restitution of funds withheld in violation of federal law barred) and
In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887) (a suit for specific performance of a contract to which
the state was a party barred). Young adopted the fiction that a suit against a state officer
to enjoin him from enforcing an unconstitutional state statute is not a suit against a state
(and hence not a suit barred by the eleventh amendment sovereign immunity absent waiver)
because state law cannot authorize an official to perform an unconstitutional action. Once
the official is stripped of the mantle of state authority, the suit becomes one against an
individual for violation of federal rights. See 209 U.S. at 159-60.
9. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
10. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
11. Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926).
12. See Douglas, 319 U.S. at 164-65; cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971)
(this pending prosecution case discusses the standards for threatened proceedings at length).
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the state defendant into relinquishing his rights furnishes a recognized
example of a situation in which the federal plaintiff's state court defense
would prove unavailing.' 3 However, the mere possibility that the state court
might erroneously apply federal constitutional standards will not constitute
irreparable injury.'4 As in other contexts, the usual expense and inconven-
ience of litigation does not give rise to irreparable injury.'"
The doctrine of equitable restraint enunciated in Douglas has not
undergone extensive development with respect to federal injunctions of
threatened civil proceedings. In at least one instance, however, the Supreme
Court rejected a request for such an injunction with a view toward the
adequacy of the state court remedy. In Cavanaugh v. Looney," the federal
plaintiff sought an injunction restraining the state attorney general from
instituting a condemnation proceeding pursuant to the state's power of
eminent domain because of alleged constitutional deficiencies in the con-
demnation statute. The Court affirmed the district court's denial of the
request, observing that the claim of irreparable injury appeared
"fanciful"' 7 and noting that objections to the validity of the condemna-
tion statute could be raised in the impending state proceedings.'"
The Anti-Injunction Act
To obtain a federal injunction of a pending state judicial proceeding,
the federal plaintiff must first hurdle the barrier posed by the Anti-
Injunction Act,' 9 part of which is codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
13. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490 (1965); see also Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 48-53 (1971) (Younger disapproves of other expressions in Dombrowski,
purportedly limiting its effect to that of a bad faith prosecution case).
14. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
15. See Douglas, 319 U.S. at 163 ("No person is immune from prosecution in good
faith for his alleged criminal acts."); cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) (pend-
ing prosecution); see also Federal Trade Comm'n v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 244
(1980) (the expense and annoyance of defending the agency's complaint in administrative
hearings did not present irreparable injury).
16. 248 U.S. 453 (1919).
17. Id. at 456.
18. See also Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932) (denying an injunction of state
tax collection proceedings in the face of adequate state court remedies because of a well-
established policy against federal interference with state tax collection); The Tax Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) (further restricting the availability of federal injunctive relief
against state tax collection to situations where the state remedy is not "plain, speedy and
efficient"); The Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976) (restricting federal injunctions of
public utility rate orders by, inter alia, the same standard).
19. Ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 334-35 (1793). The statute is construed as forbidding
injunctions against the state officials litigating the pending state court proceedings as well
as those staying the proceedings directly. See Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U.S. 148 (1898).
However, the statute does "not preclude injunctions against the institution of state court
proceedings, but only bars stays of suits already instituted." Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965). See generally P. BATOR, P. MISnKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
2283. The Act absolutely bars federal injunctions against pending state
judicial proceedings unless such relief is: (1) expressly authorized by an
act of Congress, (2) necessary in aid of the federal court's jurisdiction,
or (3) necessary to effectuate a federal court's judgment."0 A federal statute
qualifies as an "expressly authorized" exception if it creates "a specific
and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court of
equity, that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered
to enjoin a state court proceeding." 2' An injunction necessary in aid of
the federal court's jurisdiction seems to be one that is required to preserve
the federal court's authority over a res that is the subject of both federal
and state litigation. In order to "effectuate a judgment," a federal court
can enjoin relitigation of cases and controversies that have become res
judicata in a prior federal proceeding." If the federal plaintiff fails to
fit his prayer for injunctive relief under one of these three statutory ex-
ceptions, his federal suit must be dismissed irrespective of whether the
request for relief is proper under the applicable equitable principles."
In Mitchum v. Foster,5 the Court held that injunctions of pending
state proceedings under section 1983 are "expressly authorized" as an ex-
ception to the prohibition of the Anti-Injunction Act.26 Thus, section 2283
does not bar issuance of a federal injunction against pending state judicial
proceedings when that injunction is issued pursuant to section 1983. The
Court, however,27 did not remove or qualify any restraints on such relief
imposed by equitable considerations.
Pending Criminal Proceedings
In Younger v. Harris,28 the Court applied the irreparable injury stan-
dard that evolved with regard to threatened state criminal proceedings
to a request for an injunction against pending state criminal proceedings.
As with threatened proceedings, the federal plaintiff must demonstrate
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 966 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 provides: "A court of the United States may not grant an in-
junction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Con-
gress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
21. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 237 (1972).
22. See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 641 (1977) (plurality; dictum).
23. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 1237, 1251-52.
24. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398
U.S. 281, 286-87 (1970). But cf. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971) (the Act
does not bar an application for an injunction by the NLRB); Leiter Minerals v. United
States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957) (the Act does not bar an application for an injunction by the
United States).
25. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
26. Id. at 243.
27. Id.
28. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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that his state-court defense will not adequately protect his federal rights
because of bad faith, harassment, or other unusual circumstance in order
to obtain the federal injunction.29 Thus, even if the federal plaintiff clears
the Anti-Injunction Act with section 1983, his failure to satisfy the Younger
requirements will mandate dismissal of his suit to enjoin the pending state
criminal proceeding.
The Younger opinion discussed the bases of its irreparable injury re-
quirement in the context of pending criminal proceedings. The Court noted
that the traditional reluctance of courts of equity to interfere with criminal
prosecutions supports application of the irreparable injury standard.3" Yet,
in the context of a federal injunction of a criminal prosecution pending
in a state court, "more vital"'" considerations of comity and federalism
reinforce this traditional requirement. These considerations counsel that
federal sovereignty should be exercised and federal rights protected in a
manner that does not unduly interfere with the legitimate sovereign
activities of the states.32 Under Douglas and Younger, the requirement
that the federal plaintiff demonstrate that state remedies will not ade-
quately protect his federal rights allows the states to administer their
criminal laws unhampered so long as their courts remain able and willing
to guard federal rights.33
Pending Civil Proceedings
In a series of cases, the Court has extended Younger's irreparable
injury standard, with its focus on the adequacy of the opportunity to
raise federal law challenges in the state proceeding, to requests for in-
junctions against pending civil proceedings that implicate "important state
interests." 3" Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Juidice v. Vail" clearly
29. See id. at 53-54.
30. See id. at 43-44; see also In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 210-11 (1888) (the Court
observed that courts of equity were without power to stay criminal proceedings).
31. 401 U.S. at 44.
32. See id. As Justice O'Connor observed in her separate opinion in Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), "notions of federalism subordinate
neither national nor state interests." Id. at 796. Deference to state sovereignty "does not
detract from the proper role of federal power in a federalist system, but merely requires
the exercise of that power in a manner that does not destroy state independence." Id.. at
795 n.33.
33. That considerations of federal-state comity may not compel equitable restraint in
regard to threatened judicial proceedings has been suggested, however. See Lake Carriers'
Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972) (dictum); see also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,
422 U.S. 922, 930-31 (1975) (holding that the preliminary injunction of future prosecution
of the federal plaintiff was not subject to Younger's restrictions). For an evaluation of
this suggestion, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 1046-47.
34. See, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.
423 (1982).
35. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
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establishes that the " 'more vital consideration' "3 of comity, rather than
the historical equitable deference to criminal prosecutions, provides the
essential support for application of the Younger doctrine." Thus, civil
proceedings found to implicate important state interests to date include
not only those "both in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes, '"38
but also those brought for preserving the fiscal integrity of public assistance
programs," 9 for providing for the welfare of children,'" and for supervis-
ing the professional conduct of attorneys."'
The Court laid the foundation for this extension of the Younger doc-
trine in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.42 Justice Rehnquist, writing for a six-
member majority, pinpointed the "relevant considerations of federalism" 43
which indicate that federal interference with state civil proceedings pre-
sents as much of a threat to the smooth functioning of the federal system
as do injunctions of state criminal proceedings. He asserted that
interference with a state judicial proceeding [1] prevents the state
• . . from effectuating its substantive policies, [21 [prevents the
state] from continuing to perform the separate function of pro-
viding a forum competent to vindicate any constitutional objec-
tions interposed against those policies. . . [,] [3] results in
duplicative legal proceedings, and [4] can readily be interpreted
''as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce
constitutional principles.""
Arguably, these considerations will appear every time a federal court con-
siders a request for an injunction against pending judicial proceedings.
Yet, the Court continues to reserve the question of whether the Younger-
Huffman irreparable injury requirement should apply to all requests for
a federal injunction against a pending state judicial proceeding, whether
civil, criminal, or quasi-criminal.4 1
Injunctions Pursuant to Section 1983
Section 1983 provides the principal basis for federal injunctions of
36. Id. at 334 (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 601 (1975) (quoting
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44)).
37. Id. at 334-35.
38. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
39. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444-46 (1977).
40. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 434-35 (1979) (also found the provision for tem-
porary removal of children to be in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes. Id. at 423).
41. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432-35
(1982).
42. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
43. Id. at 604.
44. Id. (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974)).
45. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S.
434, 445 n.8 (1977); Juidice, 430 U.S. at 336 n.13; Huffman, 420 U.S. at 607.
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COMMENTS
pending state proceedings,4 6 and thus, consideration of this unresolved
issue properly begins with an examination of section 1983's effect on the
problem. Justice Brennan, in his dissents in Huffman, Juidice, and Trainor
v. Hernandez,"' raises the principal argument against complete extension
of the Younger-Huffman doctrine to all requests for injunctions of state
civil proceedings sought pursuant to section 1983." He urges that exten-
sion of the doctrine to such requests "effectively cripples the congres-
sional scheme enacted in [section] 1983"'' because Congress intended for
the section 1983 injunctive remedy to be available regardless of the
pendency of state civil proceedings."0 Justice Brennan bases this argument
in part on the historical fact that the rise of nationalism after the Civil
War led Congress to alter its antebellum policy of relying completely on
state courts for the protection of federal rights.' Justice Brennan argues
that, with section 1983, Congress deliberately opened the federal forum
for protection of federal rights from action under color of state law
" 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.' "52 Drawing
on dicta from cases such as Monroe v. Pape," he concludes that a federal
court should consider a prayer for an injunction against enforcement of
a state law alleged to violate a federal right without regard to the pendency
of state civil proceedings because "Congress has clearly ordained . . .
that the federal courts are to be the 'primary and powerful reliances' for
vindicating federal rights under [section] 1983."'1
46. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 950; P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO
& H. WECHSLER, 1981 SUPPLEMENT TO HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 233-34 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 SUPPLEMENT] (survey-
ing the rapid growth of § 1983 litigation).
47. 431 U.S. 434, 450 (1977). For Justice Brennan's latest expression of continued
adherence to these dissenting views, see Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State
Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 438 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring).
48. All members of the Court have agreed, at least implicitly, that significant state
interests justify application of Younger in regard to some state civil proceedings, although
plenty of room is left to wrangle over how expansive that application should be. See Middlesex
County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 438 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
49. Juidice, 430 U.S. at 343 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. See id. at 342 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Huffman, 420 U.S. at 616 (Brennan, J.
dissenting).
51. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 617 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. Juidice, 430 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225, 240 (1972)).
53. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Monroe held that a federal plaintiff need not initiate and
exhaust prospective state administrative or judicial remedies as a prerequisite to maintaining
a suit under § 1983 in federal court, declaring that "[t]he federal remedy is supplementary
to the state remedy." Id. at 183.
54. Trainor, 431 U.S. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974) (emphasis added) (quoting F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 65 (1928))).
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In essence, Justice Brennan argues that a clear congressional com-
mand to honor the federal plaintiff's choice of forum, regardless of the
state court's ability to protect his federal rights in the pending action,"3
displaces the considerations of comity and federalism which lie at the heart
of Younger's irreparable injury requirement." Yet, these considerations
have always inhered in the federal chancellor's discretion, 7 pursuant to
equity's traditional solicitude for the public interests potentially affected
by the granting of injunctive relief." Although a federal equity court must
certainly exercise its discretion in accordance with the expressed will of
Congress, 9 that body must distinctly establish "the order of priorities
in a given area" 6 in order to nullify that traditional discretion.6  The
55. In Juidice, Justice Brennan writes:
Congress imposed the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary to give due
respect to a suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of
his federal constitutional claims. Plainly, escape from that duty is not permissible
merely because state courts also have the solemn responsibility, equally with the
federal courts, ".. .to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured
by the Constitution of the United States."
430 U.S. at 342-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241,
248 (1967) (quoting Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884))).
56. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
57. "It is in the public interest that federal courts of equity should exercise their discre-
tionary power with proper regard for the rightful independence of state governments in
carrying out their domestic policy." Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 185 (1935).
Accord Meridith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943) (surveying cases); Matthews
v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932) (state tax collection case); Boise Artesian Hot & Cold
Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U.S. 276, 285 (1909) (same).
The Court's decision in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), pro-
vides a familiar example of equitable regard for principles of federal-state comity. Observ-
ing that "[flew public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chancellor
than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies," id. at 500, the Court held that
federal district courts should abstain when resolution of unsettled issues of state law necessarily
precede consideration of an underlying constitutional claim. Id. at 501. Pullman abstention
promotes harmony in federal-state relations by affording state courts the first opportunity
to construe the law of their state, as well as by precluding "the friction of a premature
constitutional adjudication." Id. at 500.
58. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200-01 (1973); United States v. Morgan,
307 U.S. 183, 194 (1939).
59. "[Wlhen Congress invokes the Chancellor's conscience to further transcendant
legislative purposes, what is required is the principled application of standards consistent
with those purposes and not 'equity [which] varies like the Chancellor's foot.' " Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (quoting Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 403,
414, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 674 (1818) (Lord Chancellor Eldon)).
60. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
61. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-94 (1978); Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975); cf. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
A grant of jurisdiction to issue compliance orders hardly suggests an absolute
duty to do so under any and all circumstances. We cannot but think that if Con-
gress had intended to make such a drastic departure from the traditions of equity
practice, an unequivocal statement of its purpose would have been made.
. ..The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor
COMMENTS
general historical background of section 1983 and the rhetoric from re-
cent jurisprudence upon which Justice Brennan relies do bear on the issue
of whether Congress displaced the chancellor's traditional concern for prin-
ciples of comity and federalism in this regard, yet they do not indicate
with "crystal clarity ' 62 that Congress intended for section 1983 injunc-
tive relief to be available "without regard to the pendency [or adequacy]
of the state suit." '6 3 In other words, accepting the premise that Congress
established the federal courts as the primary guarantors of federal rights
does not necessitate the conclusion that Congress intended for those courts
to be the exclusive protectors of those rights. Yet such exclusivity would
naturally result if the state defendant could terminate an entirely adequate
state suit with a federal injunction whenever he could establish a claim
of deprivation of federal rights under section 1983, a statute which in-
deed "cut a broad swath.'"6 Justification for such an extreme result seem-
ingly would require indicia of legislative intent which are both more direct
and more pertinent than those offered by Justice Brennan.
The Court's decision in Mitchum v. Foster6 1 probably provides the
most apposite exegesis of Congressional intent in regard to the exercise
of federal injunctive power under section 1983. In Mitchum the Court
considered the issue of whether injunctions of pending state proceedings
pursuant to section 1983 were expressly authorized by Congress as an ex-
ception to the absolute bar of the Anti-Injunction Act. As noted before,
resolution of this issue necessitated a determination of whether Congress,
in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1871, had "created a specific and
uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court of equity,
that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to en-
join a state court proceeding." 6 6 Turning to the legislative history, the
Court observed that "[p]roponents of the legislation noted that state courts
were-being used to harass and injure individuals, either because the state
courts were powerless to stop deprivations or were in league with those
who were bent upon abrogation of federally protected rights." 7 The
to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case.
. ..We do not believe that such a major departure from that long tradition
. .. should be lightly implied.
Id. at 329-30 (involving a statute stating that relief "shall be granted").
62. Juidice, 430 U.S. at 343 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
64. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 103 (1981). For
the scope of § 1983, see supra text accompanying notes 4-6. See also The Supreme Court,
1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 47, .163 & n.70 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The 1974 Term]
(relying on the "primary and powerful reliances" language "largely begs the question").
65. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
66. Id. at 237. "The test ... is whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating a federal
right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity could be given its intended scope
only by the stay of a state court proceeding." Id. at 238.
67. Id. at 240.
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remarks of Senator Osborn, in particular, demonstrated that Congress
was "extending federal power in an attempt to remedy the state courts'
failure to secure federal rights": 6"
If the State courts had proven themselves competent to suppress
the local disorders, or to maintain law and order, we should not
have been called upon to legislate . . . . We are driven by ex-
isting facts to provide for the several states in the South what
they have been unable to fully provide for themselves; i.e., the
full and complete administration of justice in the courts. 69
The Court concluded that Congress intended to grant the federal courts
power to stay state proceedings;" ° otherwise, the federal equity court could
not protect the federal rights covered by the statute from a failure of
law and of justice in state court.
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 indicates that
Congress was acting to correct an extraordinary circumstance in which
courts, even entire state judicial systems, were acting as instruments of
persecution against persons exercising their federal rights and were turn-
ing a deaf ear to defenses based on federal rights." In such situations,
Congress clearly ordered priorities in favor of a federal stay of the inade-
quate or corrupted state proceeding. However, Congress did not address,
much less order priorities in, the situation where the federal plaintiff sought
an injunction against an allegedly unconstitutional statute which was being
applied to him in a properly functioning state court which was ready and
able to consider his federal defense. Nothing in the legislative history in-
dicates that Congress intended to displace the normal equitable considera-
tions of comity and federalism in this setting. Significantly, the floor
debates spoke only to the situations which presently constitute the excep-
tions to the Younger bar-bad faith prosecution and other circumstances
undermining the adequacy of state legal remedies.7"
68. Id. at 241.
69. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 653 (1871), quoted in Mitchum, 407 U.S. at
240-41 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 242-43.
71. "[J]udges, having ears to hear, hear not ..... CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. 78 (1871) (statement of Rep. Perry), quoted in Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 241.
72. Cf. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
[O]f course the debates show that one strong motive behind [§ 1983's] enactment
was grave congressional concern that the state courts had been deficient in pro-
tecting federal rights .... But in the context of the legislative history as a whole,
this congressional concern lends only the most equivocal support to any argument
that, in cases where the state courts have recognized the constitutional claims
asserted and provided fair procedures for determining them, Congress intended
to override [28 U.S.C.] § 1738 or the common-law rules of collateral estoppel
and res judicata. Since repeals by implication are disfavored . . . much clearer
support than this would be required to hold that § 1738 and the traditional rules
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A statute should be construed and applied in light of the situation
which Congress sought to alter," especially when Congress invokes the
federal court's equitable powers. The decision to grant equitable relief
is one based inherently on the various equities presented by the particular
circumstances of a given case.74 A not unreasonable construction of sec-
tion 1983 would allow a federal equity court to inquire into the facts
of the case before it to determine whether the evil that concerned
Congress-state court inability or unwillingness to protect federal rights-is
indeed threatening to deprive the federal plaintiff of a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States. It stands neither federalism
nor section 1983 "on its head"" to remit the federal plaintiff to a pend-
ing state proceeding in which-absent bad faith or a statutory bar to his
defense-his federal rights can be as ably and as diligently protected.7"
Moreover, an even stronger reason weighs against Justice Brennan's
contention that the Reconstruction Congress intended for the federal courts
to honor the federal plaintiff's choice of forum over a pending state pro-
of preclusion are not applicable to § 1983 suits.
Id. at 98-99 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
73. See United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962); see also The 1974 Term,
supra note 64, at 163.
74. Even if the plaintiff establishes the traditional prerequisites for injunctive relief,
the granting or withholding of that relief remains within the discretion of the court. See,
e.g., Beal v. Missouri Pac, R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 50 (1941). The court does not automatically
grant the injunction but considers whether it is "the fit and appropriate mode of redress
under all the circumstances of the case." J. STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 959a, at 145 (1. Redfield ed. 1866) (1st ed. Boston 1836).
75. Juidice, 430 U.S. at 343 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. Some have doubted that state courts are actually as able and willing to protect
federal rights as are federal courts. For an excellent presentation of this view, see Neuborne,
The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 81,
at 509-10 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (questioning the suitability of state courts
for national causes because of their susceptibility to "local spirit"). Yet, to maintain that
the state courts are not as capable and diligent as federal courts flies in the face of nearly
a hundred years of Court jurisprudence. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 1315 n.16 (1983) (noting the competence of state courts to ad-
judicate federal constitutional claims); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 549 (1981) (finding
no reason to believe that state judges were not doing their "mortal best" to discharge their
oath of allegiance to the Constitution); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976)
(Justice Powell's majority opinion discusses the matter at length and concludes: "[W]e are
unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to con-
stitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States."); Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 518-19 (1955); Darr v. Burford, 339
U.S. 200, 205-06 (1950); In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 454 (1891) (the Court would not
assume that the state appellate court would allow the trial court's error to go uncorrected);
Robb v. Connolly, I1I U.S. 624, 637 (1884). The principle that state courts are competent
equally with federal courts in resolving questions of federal law seems to be both a bulwark
of the federal system and the cornerstone of the Younger doctrine. See, e.g., Doran v.
Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975); Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975). Thus,
the federal plaintiff would do well to premise his argument for the granting of injunctive
relief on some ground other than an inherent inadequacy of state courts.
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ceeding without regard to the adequacy of that proceeding. If Congress
had intended to accomplish such a result, it could have done so much
more easily and directly by granting the state defendant the right to remove
the state suit to federal court whenever the claim against him was brought
pursuant to a state statute that deprived him of a federally protected right.
Indeed, Congress enacted an analogous removal provision five years earlier
in the Civil Rights Act of 1866." 7 This provision, which remains in force,
allows removal by "any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the
courts of [a] State a right under any law providing for . .. equal civil
rights." 8 Removal under this provision is possible only when (1) the
asserted right is protected under a "law providing for specific civil rights
stated in terms of racial equality," 79 i.e., "only laws comparable in nature
to the Civil Rights Act of 1866,"I o and (2) "it can be predicted by reference
to a law of general application that the defendant will be denied or can-
not enforce the specified federal rights in the state courts." 8
Justice Brennan's broad construction of Congressional intent would
render this earlier civil rights removal statute superfluous. The ambit of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 encompasses rights protected under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.82 If injunctions pursuant to the 1871 Act issue without
regard to the pendency of state proceedings, a state defendant statutorily
deprived of a right guaranteed under the 1866 Act, and thus under the
1871 Act as well, effectively could remove the litigation from the state
court to the federal judicial system merely because the state statute in-
volved deprived him of the protected right. Yet, the now-federal plaintiff
would achieve this result regardless of whether he could show that he
was statutorily barred from enforcing the federal right in the state court,
as would be required under the civil rights removal statute. That is, the
state defendant could use a broadly-exercised injunctive power and sec-
tion 1983 to bypass the civil rights removal statute, the only direct Con-
gressional expression in regard to a state defendant's right to choose a
federal forum in civil rights cases. In accord with accepted tenets of
statutory construction, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 should be construed
77. Ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1976)).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1976).
79. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792 (1966).
80. Id. at 790. The substantive portions of the 1866 Act are codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1981. It reads:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
81. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 800 (1966).
82. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980) (by implication). Thiboutot holds
that § 1983 encompasses claims based on violations of purely statutory federal law.
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in a manner which does not render the civil rights removal statute
superfluous, especially as the language and history of the 1871 Act
plausibly support a construction which would preclude such an effect. 3
Furthermore, the Court has long held that Congress, when it passed
the general removal provision in 1887," did not give state defendants with
a federal defense the ability to transfer the case to the federal forum."
If Congress did not give the federal law defendant the right to choose
the federal forum over the pending state proceeding directly, it is unlikely
that Congress intended for the ambiguous language of section 1983 to
accomplish the same result indirectly. As Justice Brennan himself has
stated: "Courts may properly take into account the later Act when asked
to extend the reach of the earlier Act's vague language to the limits which,
read literally, the words might permit." 86
With very due respect to Justice Brennan, the legislative history does
not support his argument that Congress intended for section 1983 injunc-
tive relief to be available despite the pendency of an adequate state court
proceeding. Indeed, that legislative history can be read to support a con-
trary conclusion.8 7 His argument based on legislative intent appears
especially tenuous when it is recognized that removal provides a much
more direct means of assuring a federal forum to state defendants who
raise a federal defense. Furthermore, Justice Brennan's broad construc-
tion of section 1983 would make resort to the civil rights removal provi-
sion that Congress actually adopted unnecessary.88 It is difficult to believe
that Congress intended to produce this result with the innocuous phrase
83. Repeals by implication are not favored. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426
U.S. 148, 154 (1976); cf. United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164
(1976). In United Continental the Court wrote:
[H]ere the argument is not that the Public Vessels Act can no longer have ap-
plication to a particular set of facts, but simply that its terms can be evaded
at will by asserting jurisdiction under another statute. We should, however, be
as hesitant to infer that Congress intended to authorize evasion of a statute at
will as we are to infer that Congress intended to narrow the scope of a statute.
Both types of "repeal"-effective and actual-involve the compromise or aban-
donment of previously articulated policies, and we would normally expect some
expression by Congress that such results are intended. Indeed, the expectation
that there would be some expression of an intent to "repeal" is particularly strong
in a case like this one, in which the "repeal" would extend to virtually every
case to which the statute had application.
Id. at 169.
84. Ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553 (1887) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(1976)).
85. See Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
86. NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local Union No. 639, 362 U.S. 274, 291-92
(1960).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 77-83.
19841
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
"suit in equity.' 9 By the very use of this phrase, Congress seemingly
opted for the flexibility of equity practice rather than the rigidity of a
blanket rule removing cases involving federal rights from entirely ade-
quate state civil proceedings. Thus, nothing in the legislative history, the
relationship of section 1983 to other statutes, or the text clearly supports,
much less compels, the conclusion that the Act establishes an absolute
right to the federal forum. 90 More particularly, nothing in the relevant
legislative materials indicates that Congress intended to displace the
equitable discretion which has been traditionally exercised in light of all
pertinent factors, including the strong public interests reflected in prin-
ciples of comity and federalism. A contrary construction of the Act seems
particularly appropriate because the relief involved, a federal injunction
of a pending state court proceeding, so clearly implicates those concerns."
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Compare id., quoted supra note 5 with Hecht v. Bowles,
321 U.S. 321 (1944) (involving similar statutory language). The Hecht opinion is quoted
supra note 61.
Indeed, if Congress had so absolutely distrusted the fidelity of state courts to the Con-
stitution, it could have coupled a broad removal jurisdiction in cases involving a federal
defense with a grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the lower federal courts over § 1983 cases.
Instead, Congress indicated its trust in state courts by not depriving them of concurrent
jurisdiction over such claims. Cf. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). In Allen the Court
wrote:
As the Court has understood the history of the legislation, Congress realized
that in enacting § 1983 it was altering the balance of judicial power between the
state and federal courts .... But in doing so, Congress was addeing to the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts, not subtracting from that of the state courts. See Monroe
v. Pape, [365 U.S.] at 183 . . . ("The federal remedy is supplementary to the
state remedy . . ."). The debates contain several references to the concurrent
jurisdiction of the state courts over federal questions, and numerous suggestions
that the state courts would retain their established jurisdiction so that they could,
when the then current political passions abated, demonstrate a new sensitivity to
federal rights.
Id. at 99-100 (emphasis added; citations & footnotes omitted).
90. Cf. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1980) (finding that § 1983 did not
give every person asserting a federal right an entitlement to one unencumbered opportunity
to litigate that right in an original action in a federal district court without regard to any
prior disposition of the claim in state court).
91. Justice Brennan would surely not argue that the phrase, "the primary and power-
ful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution," Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241, 247 (1967) (emphasis added) (quoting F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note
54, at 65), possesses a talismanic quality which, of its own force, displaces the inherent
concerns of comity and federalism. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-67 (1965)
(" 'Outcome-determination' analysis was never intended to serve as a talisman."). Significantly,
the professor who originally penned that phrase, see F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra
note 54, held a view of § 1983 as a justice which differed greatly from that adhered to
by Justice Brennan.
For even if the power to grant the relief here sought may fairly and constitu-
tionally be derived from the generality of language of the Civil Rights Act, to
sustain the claim would disregard the power of courts of equity to exercise discre-
tion when, in a matter of equity jurisdiction, the balance is against the wisdom
of using their power.
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Younger's irreparable injury standard strikes the delicate balance that
is sought by these principles of comity and federalism. As noted before,
federal-state comity seeks the attainment of national goals without undue
interference with the legitimate functioning of the states. 92 By limiting its
judicial intervention to cases of irreparable injury, i.e., inadequacy of state
court remedies, the federal sovereign limits its interference with state func-
tions to those cases where federal intervention is actually necessary to
preserve federal rights. Where state remedies are adequate, the federal
plaintiff's federal rights are protected, and the state's enforcement of its
substantive law and operation of its judicial system continue free of un-
warranted federal interference.
Once it is determined that section 1983 does not displace the tradi-
tional equitable concern for federalism and comity, and that Younger's
irreparable injury standard properly reflects the federal-state balance in-
herent in these principles, the inquiry focuses upon how far these prin-
ciples carry the civil component of the Younger doctrine. The four con-
siderations of federalism canvassed by Justice Rehnquist in Huffman"
indicate that Younger's irreparable injury standard should apply in regard
to all requests for a section 1983 injunction against pending state judicial
proceedings. Arguably, every request for a federal injunction of a state
court under section 1983 will implicate these factors. Every injunction
against a pending state judicial proceeding interferes with the legitimate
functioning of the state's judicial system because it prevents the state from
providing a forum to consider federal objections to its laws. Federal con-
sideration of the merits of the federal claim prior to issuance of the in-
junction always results in duplicative proceedings which consider an issue
already before the state tribunal. Furthermore, every injunction against
a pending state judicial proceeding that is not statutorily barred from hear-
ing the federal defense necessarily casts a negative reflection upon the
state court's ability to enforce federal law, as well as upon the court's
fidelity to the rule of law under the Constitution.
The fourth Huffman factor, the impairment of the state's ability to
effectuate its substantive policies, also arises whenever the federal court
enjoins the pending state proceeding. The argument lies, however, that
[.. IT]he Court's lodestar of adjudication has been that the statute "should
be construed so as to respect the proper balance between the States and the federal
government in law enforcement." Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108. Only
last term we reiterated our conviction that the Civil Rights Act "was not to be
used to centralize power so as to upset the federal system."
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120-21 (1951) (criminal proceeding) (quoting Collins
v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 658 (1951)).
92. See supra text accompanying note 32.
93. See supra text accompanying note 44.
1984]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
these policies may not always reflect "important state interests"' 4 and
thus Younger abstention should not be required in regard to all state
judicial proceedings. The requirements of comity and federalism must
determine whether a distinction between "important" and "unimportant"
state interests is tenable for purposes of Younger abstention.
If the Court were to institute such a dichotomy, it would risk effect-
ing a double affront to state sovereignty. The state would not only suf-
fer the harshness of an injunction against enforcement of its substantive
law in its own pending court proceedings; it would be further informed
that the intrusive federal injunction was justified because the federal court
somehow considered the state's interest in the particular subject matter
"unimportant." Furthermore, federal interference in pending enforcement
of purportedly "unimportant" state interests could prove detrimental to
that "healthy pluralism""' which is an important concomitant of the
federalism principle." That is, a federal court's conclusion that a state's
policy is not "important," and thus is subject to federal court interference,
may hinder a state's commencement of a novel social experiment by stall-
ing its construction and implementation in the state's own courts.
Arguably, the Court should eschew the selective censorial role embodied
in a distinction between "important" and "unimportant" state interests
because of the stultifying and stifling effect of an injunction issued on
such a basis.9
94. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982).
95. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 606 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
96. The federalism principle affords states "the opportunity ... for experimentation
and innovation, with freedom to discard or amend that which proves unsuccessful or detrimen-
tal to the public good." Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 403 (1977) (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). See also Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Chandler
v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 571 (1981); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 282 (1980); Greenholtz
v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979); Ad-
dington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979). Justice Brandeis first expressed this important
aspect of federalism.
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to
the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
97. That the Court theoretically distinguished between "legitimate," "important," and
"compelling" state interests on the merits of equal protection claims aids little, if at all,
in developing criteria for distinguishing cases which might be appropriate for federal court
consideration in spite of abstention principles. The analyses are clearly not interchangeable.
For example, while tax collection and disbursement might prove merely a "legitimate" in-
terest for equal protection review, cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973), that interest is clearly "important" for purposes of comity and federalism.
See, e.g., Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521 (1934).
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Moreover, in suits in which the state is a party, the state will have
invoked its legislative, judicial, and executive capacities in pursuit of its
substantive policy by the time an injunction is sought in the federal district
court. Whatever the subjective "importance" of that policy, this multi-
institutional commitment of state resources should indicate that effectua-
tion of that policy is "important" for determining the requirements of
comity and federalism. Phrased another way, by the time state judicial
proceedings commence, the state will have committed sufficient govern-
mental resources to enforcement of a policy to render a federal injunc-
tion of the pending proceeding highly intrusive. Thus, in terms of in-
terference with legitimate state interests, all four of the considerations of
federalism and comity outlined in Huffman counsel application of the
Younger doctrine to at least those judicial proceedings in which the state
is a party.
Section 1983 Injunctions of Wholly Private State Civil Suits
A distinction between state-initiated enforcement actions and wholly
private litigation is closely related to the distinction based upon the relative
importance of various state interests." Some lower courts have held that
Younger's irreparable injury requirement should apply only to state-
initiated enforcement actions. 9 The underlying premise of these cases-
that concerns of comity and federalism are not as compelling in suits be-
tween purely private litigants-is questionable.' °9 Indeed, delegation of the
98. Compare Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977) ("The District Court
thought that Younger policies were irrelevant because suits to recover money and writs of
attachment were available to private parties as well as the State .... But the fact remains
that the State was a party to the suit .... ") with Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336
n.12 (1977) ("Contempt in these cases, serves, of course, to vindicate and preserve the private
interests of competing litigants, . . . but its purpose is by no means spent upon purely
private concerns." (Citation omitted)).
99. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kelley, 583 F.2d 1242, 1249 (3d Cir. 1978); see also Younger,
401 U.S. at 56 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring) (comparing the offense to state interests presented
by injunctions of criminal and civil proceedings in which the state may not be a'party);
O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680, 695 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (holding that the Younger
doctrine did not apply to the instant civil suits which involved wholly private disputes and
in which federal intervention would not affect any important state interests). See generally
17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4254 (1978).
100. See, e.g., Comment, Limiting the Younger Doctrine: A Critique and Proposal,
67 CALIF. L. REV. 1318, 1320, 1343-45 (1979) (neither state nor federal interests depend
upon whether the state initiated the suit); Recent Decisions, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 911, 925
(1979) (the distinction is inconsistent with the underlying policy of respect for state court
competency); Case Comments, 13 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1187, 1202 (1979) (Younger's paramount
concern is not identity of the parties, but state autonomy); see also Webb v. Webb, 451
U.S. 493, 499 (1981) ("Principles of comity in our federal system require that the state
courts be afforded the opportunity to perform their duty, which includes responding to
attacks on state authority based on the federal law, or, if the litigation is wholly private,
construing and applying the applicable federal requirements." (Emphasis added)).
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civil suit to private parties may indicate a greater state interest in con-
trolling certain behavior because the state may conclude that entrusting
the litigation to parties with strong self-interests is the most effective means
of enforcement.'"' In any event, the question of whether the Younger doc-
trine should be applicable to wholly private civil suits should be viewed
in the specific contexts in which Younger would be at issue.
In regard to requests for injunctions under section 1983, the mere
filing of a private civil action may not support a cause of action under
the statute. To establish a cause of action under section 1983, the federal
plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he has been deprived of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the defen-
dant deprived him of this right "under color of state law."' 2 Where the
right involved is one secured against only state governmental interference,
the plaintiff can satisfy the first requirement only if he shows that the
defendant's action constitutes "state action."'0 3 If he establishes the
presence of state action, he will have satisfied the "under color of state
law" requirement as well."' Several lower courts have held that the mere
filing of a private civil action does not constitute state action and thus
initiation of a private civil suit will not provide a basis under section 1983
for a federal court's injunction of the pending state civil proceeding. 0 5
That such conduct would constitute action under color of state law in
claims involving federal rights not subject to the state action requirement
seems unlikely.'6
101. See Gresham Park Community Org. v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1248 (5th Cir. 1981);
Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings: The
Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C.L. REV. 591, 682 (1975).
102. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978). The federal plaintiff
must also demonstrate the presence of these elements to sustain jurisdiction under § 1983's
jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (Supp. V 1981), which restricts jurisdiction
over claims of statutory violations to claims under statutes that provide for equal rights.
See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979). The general federal
question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. V 1981), may provide an alternate basis of jurisdic-
tion, however. For a discussion of such, see 1981 Supplement, supra note 46, at 246.
103. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928-29 (1982); Gresham Park
Community Org. v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1237 (5th Cir. 1981). As the Court recently
explained in Lugar, the "state action" issue is one of whether "the conduct allegedly causing
the deprivation of a federal right [is] fairly attributable to the state." 457 U.S. at 937.
Conduct is "fairly attributable" to the state when (1) "the deprivation [is] caused by the
exercise of some right or privilege created by the state or by a rule of conduct imposed
by the state or by a person for whom the state is responsible," id., and (2) "the party
charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor..
• .[either] because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained
significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the
state." Id.
104. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982). That all action under
color-of state law satisfies the state action requirement does not follow, however. Id. at
935 n.18.
105. See, e.g., Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 444 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1971).
106. Section 1983 encompasses claims based on constitutional and statutory provisions
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The state court's issuance of an immediately enforceable judgment
that applies state law to deprive the federal plaintiff of a federal right
should constitute state action, and thus action under color of state law. 7
At this point, the court's action is "fairly attributable"'05 to the state
because the state's full power and authority can be invoked to accomplish
the deprivation of federal rights.0 9 Ordinarily, a judgment awarding
that do not contain a state action limitation. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980)
(by implication) (§ 1983 provides a cause of action for a state's deprivation of welfare benefits
provided for under the federal Social Security Act). Under the Court's analysis in Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), the under color of state law requirement would
attain distinct relevance in regard to such claims. That is, the finding of a deprivation of
a federal right in such cases would not involve a finding of state action, and thus, the
finding of the federal violation would not automatically satisfy the under color of state
law requirement. See id. at 935 n.18. Thus, assuming that the mere commencement of the
private civil action operated as a deprivation of a federal right secured against private action,
the federal plaintiff would have to show that the filing of the suit constituted an act under
color of state law. In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), the Court stated
that, while more might be required under this standard, action "with knowledge of and
pursuant to" state law was an essential requisite. Id. at 162 n.23. Although commencement
of a private civil action may satisfy this essential feature of the under color of state law
standard, whether mere filing would satisfy any additional requirements is unknown. Cf.
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978) (not finding the requisite "state ac-
tion," the Court did not determine whether a warehouseman's sale of goods entrusted to
him, as permitted by a state statute, would constitute action under color of state law even
if the Adickes standard was satisfied). That such action would constitute action under color
of state law seems unlikely. Compare Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 n.21 (expressly not holding
that a private party's mere invocation of legal procedures satisfies the under color of state
law requirement) with id. at 951 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist and O'Con-
nor, JJ.) (stating that cases do not establish that such conduct would satisfy the under
color of state law requirement).
107. See, e.g., Gresham Park Community Org. v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1238-41 (5th
Cir. 1981); Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1074 (1980); cf. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982) (when
a § 1983 plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a state prejudgment attachment pro-
ceeding in a damage action against the creditor, the private party who sets the attachment
action in motion is a state actor).
108. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
109. See Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F. 2d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1074 (1980). Where, on the other hand, the state plaintiff merely uses the court
to enforce a valid state rule, the presence of an immediately enforceable judgment should
not constitute state action, even if the state plaintiff's underlying motive is retaliation against
the federal plaintiff's exercise of his otherwise federally protected rights. See, e.g., Higbee
v. Starr, 698 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1983) (use of a valid state eviction procedure for the im-
proper purpose of retaliating against the federal plaintiff's exercise of constitutional rights
is not state action under Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)); Miller v.
Hartwood Apts., 689 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1982) (similar); Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d
1346 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 788 (1983) (in an action for damages against
a "deprogrammer" of persons in various unconventional religious sects, the fact that the
deprogrammer had duped the court into appointing the plaintiff's father as a temporary
guardian did not present state action); cf. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980) (in this
§ 1983 damages action against a private party for obtaining an illegal injunction against
continued mineral production, the defendant's mere victory in state court did not present
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monetary damages will not be immediately enforceable until the period
for appellate review has expired or until the judgment is sustained by
the state's highest court.'' In the absence of a stay, a state court injunc-
tion presents an immediately enforceable judgment.''
Thus, at least with respect to section 1983 suits subject to a state
action requirement," 2 the federal court should possess no statutory power
to enjoin pending private state civil proceedings until the state court issues
an immediately enforceable judgment. The presence of such a judgment
does not end the federal plaintiff's problems, however. Successfully stating
a claim for relief under section 1983 in this context merely exposes the
federal plaintiff's claim to principles of jurisdiction, res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel which could render consideration of the Younger ques-
tion unnecessary.
A question of jurisdiction presents the first potential obstacle to the
federal plaintiff's claim. A federal district court is without jurisdiction
to enjoin enforcement of a state court judgment if issuance of the injunc-
tion would constitute an exercise of appellate jurisdiction over the state
court. " That the lower federal courts lack appellate jurisdiction over state
courts follows simply from the fact that Congress has not provided them
with such jurisdiction."" The lower federal courts possess only such
state action (dictum), but the corrupt conspiracy with the state court trial judge to deny
federal rights did present state action); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)
(the mere licensing of a private club that practiced racial discrimination was not state action,
but a statutory requirement that a club comply with its bylaws, which were in fact
discriminatory, presented state action). But cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial
enforcement of restrictive covenants based on race constitutes state action). Arguably, the
state plaintiff's scienter presents too tenuous of a link between the exercise of state power
and the deprivation of federal rights in such situations. Whether such action would satisfy
the independent "under color" requirement is, of course, a question subject to only conjec-
tural discussion. For such discussion, see supra note 106.
110. But cf. Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 291, 299-300 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980) (the requirement of a supersedeas bond that would have bankrupt
the NAACP rendered a money judgment immediately enforceable).
11l. See Gresham Park Community Org. v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1239 n.31 (5th Cir.
1981); see also Lewis Serv. Center v. Mack Fin. Corp., 696 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1982) (state
action was present for purposes of this § 1983 damages action against the creditor because
a temporary court order in the state replevin action directed the federal plaintiff to hold
his property "unimpaired and unencumbered" until a hearing on the merits).
112. For a discussion of § 1983 suits that are not subject to the state action require-
ment, see supra note 106.
113. Cf. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983)
(the district court could not hear claims "inextricably intertwined" with the District of Col-
umbia court's judicial denial of the federal plaintiff's application for admission to the bar
because such claims called for a direct review of a state court decision); Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (the district court possessed no jurisdiction to declare a
state court judgment null and void on constitutional grounds).
114. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. V 1981) ("original jurisdiction" over claims
raising federal questions); id. § 1343(3) (Supp. V 1981) ("original jurisdiction" over civil
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jurisdiction as is entrusted to them by Congress. ' "
Thus, whether issuance of the injunction against the state court's judg-
ment constitutes an exercise of original or appellate jurisdiction determines
the presence or absence of the district court's power.' 6 The Court's re-
cent decision in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman"' in-
structs that the nature of the underlying claim, rather than the nature
of the relief sought, determines whether the court's action would be original
or appellate. If the plaintiff presents federal claims to the district court
that are "inextricably intertwined"'' 8 with the judicial decision of a state
court, then the court "is in essence being called upon to review the state
court decision."' 9 A claim challenging a state court judgment on the basis
that the applicable state law violated the plaintiff's federal rights calls
for appellate review of the state court's decision and thus falls outside
of the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. 2 ' Thus, a federal court
cannot enjoin enforcement of a state court judgment on this basis without
exceeding the jurisdiction conferred on it by Congress.' 2 ' Feldman makes
rights claims); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 175 (1803) ("[T]he plain
import of the words seems to be, that .. .its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate
. . . ."). Congress can, of course, vest district courts with appellate jurisdiction. See Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 338 (1816) (dictum).
115. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). But cf. Battaglia v. General
Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948) (suggests
fifth amendment due process constraints on Congressional control over jurisdiction); Maraist,
Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger, and Beyond,
50 TEX. L. REV. 1324, 1325 n.7 (1972) (same thesis).
116. Cf. Marbury.v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (the Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tion over the claim depended upon whether issuance of the mandamus to Madison would
be an act of appellate or original jurisdiction).
117. 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983).
118. Id. at 1315 n.16.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 1316-17.
121. Feldman should put to rest the notion that the Court's holding in Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), involved a mere matter of pleading. Rooker held that a
federal district court had no jurisdiction to declare a state supreme court judgment null
and void as violative of the Constitution. Some lower courts and commentators read Rooker
as turning on the fact that the federal plaintiffs requested that the district court vacate
the state court judgment, an exclusively appellate act. Under this reading, the federal plain-
tiff could avoid Rooker merely by styling his complaint as a request for an injunction against
enforcement of the state court judgment, rather than as a request to vacate the judgment.
This view lead to the conclusion that the adoption of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8,
with its provision for the liberal reading of complaints, overruled Rooker in 1938. The court
would read the complaint as one requesting an injunction. See, e.g., Gresham Park Com-
munity Org. v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1236 (5th Cir. 1981), and authorities cited therein.
Feldman belies this view by steering the inquiry away from a mechanical classification of
the relief requested and toward consideration of the nature of the underlying claim.
Feldman also undercuts another jurisdictional approach taken by the Gresham court. The
Fifth Circuit had also read Rooker as possibly turning on an absence of either diversity
or state action as a ground for original jurisdiction independent of the prohibited appellate
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it emphatically clear that this result should follow even if the federal plain-
tiff fails to raise his federal claims in state court.' 22
Not all claims challenging a state court judgment should require ap-
pellate review of a state court decision, however.' In essence, an appeal
differs from an original action in that an exercise of appellate jurisdic-
tion requires review of another court's resolution of factual and legal
issues." ' If the federal plaintiff's claim does not assail findings of fact
or conclusions of law "inextricably intertwined" with the state court deci-
sion, but raises extrinsic matters that affect the validity of the judgment
without regard to whether the state court erred on the merits, then the
claim should fall within the district court's original jurisdiction. The Court
has long recognized a similar distinction, one between appellate review
of a state court's decision for legal or factual errors and an original ac-
tion to raise extrinsic matters that affect the state court victor's right to
jurisdiction. The court reasoned that if the "under color of state law" requirement for
original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) were satisfied, then the inability to exercise
appellate jurisdiction would be irrelevant. Gresham, 652 F.2d at 1236. Yet, in Feldman
the Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over claims that were inextricably
intertwined with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decision even though those
claims presented federal questions which otherwise could have been raised in an original
federal action. The Fifth Circuit's approach simply overlooked the fact that the mere presence
of a claim of deprivation of federal right under color of state law in no way answers the
question of whether that claim falls within the "original jurisdiction" conferred on the district
courts by § 1343(3). Cf. Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. 80, 82-83 (1878) (the Court recognized
that, in this removal case where diversity jurisdiction was present, entertaining proceedings
tantamount to an appeal would effectively vest the lower courts with appellate jurisdiction
over state courts in all cases where diversity jurisdiction was present).
122. In Dasher v. Supreme Court, 658 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit held
that a district court had jurisdiction over constitutional claims that a federal plaintiff had
failed to raise in state court proceedings that denied his application for admission to a
state bar. The Feldman Court described the reasoning of Dasher as "flawed." 103 S. Ct.
at 1315 n.16. In a related development, the Court vacated and remanded the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Howell v. State Bar, 674 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1982), with an express directive
to reconsider the case in light of Feldman. See Howell v. State Bar, 103 S. Ct. 1515 (1983).
On remand, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the erroneous promise of the reservation ex-
pressed in England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), even
when coupled with the federal plaintiff's reliance, could not give rise to federal jurisdiction
that did not otherwise exist under Feldman. See Howell v. State Bar, 710 F.2d 1075 (5th
Cir. 1983).
123. Feldman focuses upon the distinction between review of state court decisions and
general facial challenges to legislatively-adopted rules, see 103 S. Ct. at 1316-17, and is
thus not especially helpful in distingushing between "appellate" and "original" challenges
to state court judgments.
124. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 175 (1803) ("It is the essential
criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause
already instituted, and does not create that cause."). For an analysis of the relation be-
tween appellate and original jurisdiction in this context, see Chang, Rediscovering the Rooker
Doctrine: Section 1983, Res Judicata and the Federal Courts, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1337, 1346-49
(1980).
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benefit from the judgment, in regard to suits to enjoin enforcement of
state court judgments obtained through fraud. '25 Arguably, claims that
the opposing litigant conspired with the state trial judge to deprive the
federal plaintiff of his rights' 6 or that the proceeding itself deprived him
of procedural due process' 7 should raise matters extrinsic to the controver-
sy that was the subject of the state court proceeding. In these and similar
circumstances, the federal court should be able to enjoin enforcement of
a state court judgment in the exercise of its original jurisdiction even
though the injunction effectively nullifies the state court's decision.
Under the foregoing analysis, a federal district court will possess
jurisdiction over a request for an injunction against enforcement of a state
civil judgment only to the extent that the underlying claim stands on issues
extrinsic to the state court's decision. As this constraint arises not from
a policy choice to inhibit relitigation or to effectuate federal-state comity
but rather from limits on the subject matter jurisdiction of the district
courts, it cannot be avoided by waiver or through an exercise of the court's
discretion. Yet, even if jurisdictional concerns do not pose as serious an
obstacle as has been outlined above, principles of res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel may confine the availability of the injunctive remedy to
a correspondingly limited class of cases.' 8
The congressional command contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1738 requires
all federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state-court judgments
as would the courts of the judgment-rendering state.' 29 Section 1738 thus
125. See Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. 80 (1878). In Barrow the Court wrote:
The distinction between the two classes of cases may be somewhat nice, but it
may be affirmed to exist. In the one class there would be a mere revision of
errors and irregularites, or of the legality and correctness of the judgments and
decrees of the State courts; and in the other class, the investigation of a new
case arising upon new facts, although having relation to the validity of an actual
judgment or decree, or of the party's right to claim any benefit by reason thereof.
Id. at 83. See also Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, 597-99 (1891); cf. Ballance v. Forsyth,
65 U.S. (24 How.) 183 (1860) (similar distinction in regard to injunctions of enforcement
of federal judgments); Parker v. Judges of the Circuit Court, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 561,
563 (1827). For a discussion of the relation between federal injunctions of fraudulently-
obtained state judgments and the Anti-Injuction Act, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note
19, at 1236, 1253.
126. Cf. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980) (in this damages action, the opposing
litigant and the state trial judge conspired to unlawfully enjoin the federal plaintiff's mineral
production; the Court found that the litigant acted under color of state law).
127. Cf. Rhoades v. Penfold, 694 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1983) (the federal plaintiff, an
indigent, alleged that the state court had deprived her of procedural due process by failing
to provide her with appointed counsel in a custody termination hearing; her inability to
afford counsel contributed to her forfeiting her right to appeal in the state courts).
128. Cf. Chang, supra note 124, at 1355 (equating the scope of the jurisdictional bar
in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), with that of the res judicata law
of the rendering state).
129. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982); Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980). 28 U.S.C. § 1738 reads in pertinent part: "The ...judicial pro-
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makes the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata available to
federal litigants to the same extent that these principles could be raised
in the courts of the state in which the earlier judgment was rendered.
Generally, collateral estoppel prevents a party from relitigating an issue
of fact or law actually litigated in and necessary to a prior judgment even
if the later suit pursues a different cause of action.'3I Res judicata, on
the other hand, broadens the preclusion to issues that were or could have
been raised in a prior action but limits its application to the plaintiff's
second suit on the same claim or the defendant's attack on an adverse
judgment.' 3 Where section 1738 is fully applicable, a state's principles
of collateral estoppel operate conclusively in federal court unless the pro-
ceedings leading to the prior state judgment fail to satisfy the minimum
procedural requirements of due process.' 32
In Allen v. McCurry,'" the Court held that section 1983 does not
present a blanket exception to section 1738 or a categorical bar to ap-
plication of principles of collateral estoppel.'" The Court noted its earlier
implicit approval of lower court decisions applying res judicata principles
in section 1983 suits,'33 yet expressly reserved the question of whether res
judicata should bar litigation of a federal issue that a section 1983 plain-
tiff could have raised but failed to do so in an earlier state-court suit
between the parties.' 36 The majority view among the circuits concludes
that resjudicata applies in section 1983 suits'37 and that the doctrine may
bar litigation in a section 1983 suit of issues that might have been raised,
but were not, in a prior state proceeding.'" While the Court has not
ceedings of any court of any such State . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by
law or usage in the courts of such State .... 1"
130. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Developments in the Law-Section
1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1333 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments
in the Law].
131. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d
196, 198 (7th Cir. 1982); Developments in the Law, supra note 130, at 1331-32. Some courts
and commentators use res judicata generically to denote the entire class of preclusion prin-
ciples. See McCurry, 449 U.S. at 94 n.5. In order to avoid confusion, the term is used
herein only in the narrow sense defined in the text.
132. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82 (1982).
133. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
134. In particular, the Court held that the unavailability of federal habeas corpus review
did not render the doctrine of collateral estoppel inapplicable to the federal plaintiff's §
1983 suit for damages.
135. See 449 U.S. at 96.
136. Id. at 97 n.10. See also Castorr v. Brundage, 103 S. Ct. 240 (1982) (White, J.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
137. See, e.g., Southern Jam, Inc. v. Robinson, 675 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1982); see
also Developments in the Law, supra note 130, at 1336-43 (arguing that principles of res
judicata, but not of collateral estoppel, should apply in § 1983 suits).
138. See, e.g., Southern Jam, Inc. v. Robinson, 675 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1982). Justice
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expressly held that section 1738 requires the application of state preclu-
sion rules, rather than a body of federal common law, in section 1983
suits, '39 most lower courts look to the applicable state law.'14  Whether
section 1983 may temper the command of section 1738 in certain cir-
cumstances remains to be seen.' Presently, however, no generally-
recognized exception to section 1738 prevents its application of state-law
preclusion principles to determine whether federal claims raised in sup-
port of a section 1983 suit to enjoin enforcement of an earlier state court
judgment should be barred by that judgment.
If the federal plaintiff overcomes the obstacles posed by the re-
quirements of the section 1983 cause of action, the limitations of the
federal district court's original jurisdiction, and federal full faith and
credit,' 2 then he will be able to press his argument that the Younger doc-
trine should not apply to his request for an injunction of a purely private
state civil suit. The plaintiff can succeed in this argument only if he
demonstrates that concerns for federal-state comity are of considerably
less moment when the state suit originates in a private dispute. As in-
timated earlier, the soundness of any such conclusion seems dubious.' 3
The plaintiff's arguments should carry even less force, however, in the
post-judgment context that arises under section 1983. Even assuming that
the suit involves only private concerns before judgment, it ceases to be
an exclusively private affair upon issuance of an immediately enforceable
White's opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Castorr v. Brundage, 103 S.
Ct. 240 (1982), supplies a head count of the circuits for and against the majority view.
139. Cf. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82 (1982) (so holding
for suits under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976
& Supp. V 1981)).
140. See, e.g., Folsom Inv. Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032, 1035-36 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding
that federal courts cannot grant even greater preclusive effect to state-court judgments than
would the courts of the judgment-rendering state).
141. Justice Stevens has suggested that the character of the federal constitutional claim
or of the earlier state proceeding bears on the relationship between § 1983 and § 1738.
See Castorr v. Brundage, 103 S. Ct. 240, 241 (1982) (opinion respecting denial of certiorari);
see also McCurry, 449 U.S. at 105 n.25 (the Court did not decide how collateral estoppel
or § 1738 should apply in the case). McCurry seems to recognize that § 1983's legislative
history might support a federal exception to state preclusion principles based on a state
court's failure to provide a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue, see 449 U.S. at
101, but whether this exception would have more content in § 1983 suits than the pro-
cedural due process limitations recognized for title VII suits in Kremer v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82 (1982), remains unresolved.
142. Res judicata and collateral estoppel might not be available because of waiver, see,
e.g., Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 n.19 (1975), or because the law of the
judgment-rendering state reflects a liberal view toward relitigation. See, e.g., Folsom Inv.
Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1982) (liberal relitigation under Louisiana's civil
law concept of res judicata); see also Comment, Litigation Preclusion in Louisiana: Welch
v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation and the Death of Collateral Estoppel, 53 TUL. L. REv.
875 (1979).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
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judgment. Arguably, this commitment of the state's power and authority
to effectuation of the state policy underlying the judgment would render
any subsequent federal intervention highly intrusive. Application of
Younger's irreparable injury standard here merely insures that any such
post-judgment intrustion will occur only when deficiencies in the state ap-
pellate process make intervention necessary to protect federal rights. '4
The facts of Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers14 provide a suitable basis for illustrating the operation of these
principles in the context of a section 1983 injunction of a purely private
state civil suit. The plaintiff union had been picketing a switching yard,
but the railroad had successfully halted this practice with a state court
injunction. Subsequent to the issuance of this injunction in Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., the Supreme Court
held that the Railway Labor Act' precluded a state court from enjoin-
ing picketing by the plaintiff and certain other unions at a terminal im-
mediately adjacent to the switching yard. Despite such a strong prece-
dent, the state court refused to dissolve its injunction, so the union sought
and obtained a federal injunction against enforcement of the state court
injunction. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the federal injunc-
tion was not permitted since not necessary either in aid of the district
court's jurisdiction or in order to protect or effectuate its judgments.
The intriguing question remains of what might happen if, on the same
facts, the union attempted to protect its federal right to picket by way
of an injunction pursuant to section 1983. The state court injunction would
constitute an immediately enforceable judgment and would thus present
action under color of state law. Having established the deprivation of
its federal right through action under color of state law, the union would
state a cause of action under section 1983 and would thereby overcome
the barrier presented by the Anti-Injunction Act. However, the conclu-
sion that federal law did not preclude issuance of the state court injunc-
tion was not only intertwined with, but was in fact central to, the state
court's decision not to dissolve its injunction. The state court had even
considered and distinguished the specific decision upon which the union
based its claim in federal court. Thus, the claim should fall outside of
the original jurisdiction granted to the district court.'" Moreover, col-
144. See also Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607-11 (1975) (the Court recognized
that considerations of federalism are no less compelling in the context of post-judgment
intervention and thus adopted a requirement of exhaustion of appellate remedies for those
actions subject to Younger during trial).
145. 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
146. 394 U.S, 369 (1969).
147. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
148. The Court wrote in Atlantic Coast Line R.R.:
[W]e are convinced that the union in effect tried to get the Federal District Court
to decide that the state court judge was wrong in distinguishing the Jacksonville
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lateral estoppel should preclude relitigation of the federal preemption issue
as it had actually been argued in the state court proceedings.
Even if the union could overcome these difficulties, it probably could
not satisfy Younger's irreparable injury standard. As Justice Black sug-
gested in his Atlantic Coast Line R.R. opinion, a plaintiff in the union's
position normally would have an adequate remedy in the state's appellate
courts.'4 9 In particular, the union could obtain a stay of the state trial
court order from the state's appellate courts upon a showing of irreparable
injury in its traditional equitable sense. The deprivation of its federal right
to apply economic pressure through picketing, a loss which cannot be
compensated by money damages, should provide a sufficient basis for
a stay under the traditional standard. The availability of such a remedy
would give the union an adequate opportunity to protect its right to picket,
absent any bias in the state appellate courts. Thus, as a matter primarily
of federal court jurisdiction, but also of collateral estoppel and equitable
restraint, the union should not obtain a federal injunction on facts similar
to those present in Atlantic Coast Line R.R., even were it to avoid the
bar of the Anti-Injunction Act by resort to section 1983.
Injunctions Pursuant to Other Bases of Federal Relief
A federal plaintiff need not demonstrate state action or action under
color of state law in order to establish a cause of action for injunctive
relief under federal statutes other than section 1983. Free of this limita-
tion, he can seek a federal stay of a private state civil suit without regard
to whether the state court has rendered an immediately enforceable judg-
ment. The problems of jurisdiction and preclusion that are attendant to
injunctions of such judgments under section 1983 will arise only if the
federal plaintiff chooses to wait until after judgment to seek relief. Yet,
regardless of whether the federal plaintiff requests federal intervention
before or after issuance of the state court judgment, he must first fit
his claim under one of three exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act.' "
Terminal decision. Such an attempt to seek appellate review of a state decision
in the Federal District Court cannot be justified as necessary "to protect or effec-
tuate" the 1967 order.
398 U.S. at 293. "Nor was an injunction necessary because the state court may have taken
action which the federal court was certain was improper under the Jacksonville Terminal
decision. Again, lower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of
state court decisions." Id. at 296.
149. See id.
150. Some question exists as to whether § 2283 applied to a stay sought after judgment
in the state court on the theory that the state proceedings are completed and thus no longer
pending. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 1236, 1253. Yet, the entire court in
Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977), discussed infra text accompanying
notes 156-61, apparently assumed that the Act actually does apply to injunctions against
enforcement of state-court judgments. Moreover, the original proponent of the Act clearly
intended for it to apply in the post-judgment context. See Randolph, Report on the Judiciary
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Moreover, unless the particular facts of his case render the injunction
necessary either in aid of the district court's jurisdiction or to effectuate
its judgments, the plaintiff must establish his statutory basis for relief
as an "expressly authorized" exception to the Act.'"
Under Mitchum v. Foster,'52 a statute will constitute an "expressly
authorized" exception (1) if the statute creates "a specific and uniquely
federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court of equity,""' 3 and
(2) if the federal right or remedy could be frustrated or denied its in-
tended scope if the federal court were not authorized to stay pending state
court proceedings." Arguably, the Mitchum test will be satisfied whenever
a statute authorizes injunctive relief in circumstances constituting
irreparable injury under Younger. If a party cannot adequately protect
his federal right or remedy in the pending state court proceeding, the right
or remedy will necessarily be frustrated and denied its intended scope unless
a federal court is empowered to intervene. The Younger standard permits
federal intervention only when the right or remedy would be so impaired
or frustrated. Thus, if a federal statute creates a federal right or remedy
that is enforceable with a federal injunction and that right or remedy
cannot be adequately protected in a pending state court proceeding (i.e.,
Younger's irreparable injury is present), then an injunction of the state
court proceeding will be "expressly authorized" under the statute.
One indication of the congruence between the Mitchum and Younger
tests lies in the fact that the very circumstances that led the Mitchum
Court to recognize section 1983 as an exception to section 2283 also pre-
sent irreparable injury under Younger.'55 Another illustration may be found
in Vendo Co. v. Lektro- Vend Corp.,' the Supreme Court's most recent
attempt to apply Mitchum's test. In Vendo, the federal plaintiff sought
an injunction against enforcement of a state-court judgment obtained in
the course of a single nonrepetitive suit for breach of noncompetition
covenants.' 57 The federal suit alleged that the state-court proceeding was
being used to harass the plaintiff and to prevent it from engaging in its
federally-guaranteed right to compete commercially with the defendant.
System to the House of Representatives, in 1 Am. STATE PAPERS, MISCELLANEOUS no. 17,
at 21-36 (Washington 1834), quoted in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118,
130 (1941).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
152. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
153. Id. at .237.
154. Id. at 238.
155. See supra text accompanying note 72.
156. 433 U.S. 623 (1977).
157. The defendant in the federal action raised the matter of full faith and credit under
§ 1738, but none of the justices reached the issue because reversal was predicated on other
grounds. See id. at 629. The jurisdictional problems outlined earlier in the text, see supra
text accompanying notes 113-28, are not raised or considered in the Vendo opinions.
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The plaintiff sought relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act,' which
authorizes a private action for injunctive relief against violations of the
antitrust laws.
The attempt to apply the Mitchum test to these facts produced a
splintered Court. Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and Justices
Stewart and Powell, concluded that section 16 did not satisfy the second
prong of the test, and thus the three justices voted to deny injunctive
relief. Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger, concurred in
this result, but on the ground that section 16 itself would not authorize
an injunction unless the pending state-court proceedings are "part of a
'pattern of baseless, repetitive claims' that [is] being used as an an-
ticompetitive device."' The concurring opinion further indicated that the
two justices would hold that section 16 constituted an expressly authoriz-
ed exception to section 2283 under such circumstances. The four dissenters
agreed with the concurring justices that section 16 qualified as an expressly
authorized exception, but disagreed with the conclusion that the single,
nonrepetitive claim involved did not support an injunction under section 16.
A six-justice majority would have held in Vendo that injunctions of
pending state court proceedings are expressly authorized under section 16
of the Clayton Act. Yet, an actual holding to this effect did not arise
because only a minority of the Court concluded that injunctive relief was
appropriate under the facts presented. Arguably, a single, allegedly
baseless, state suit that is not part of a larger pattern of vexatious litiga-
tion does not present irreparable injury under Younger because the state
court defendant can raise the federal right to compete as an affirmative
defense in the state-court proceeding." 61 If the suit is part of a pattern
of repetitive sham state-court proceedings, however, the ability to raise
the right to compete as a defense in the single state court proceeding will
not adequately protect that right from anti-competitive harassment. Such
circumstances clearly present irreparable injury under the Younger
doctrine."' Significantly, a six-justice majority would have held that the
Anti-Injunction Act does not bar a federal stay in this situation. Thus,
Vendo indicates that the Court will not deny a request for a federal stay
158. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982).
159. 433 U.S. at 644 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting California Motor Transp. Co.
v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972)).
160. Any "disadvantage" to which the federal plaintiff is put in the initial pro-
ceeding is diminished by his ability to set up the federal antitrust claim as an
affirmative defense, reviewable by this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (3), and
his ability to sue for treble damages resulting from the vexatious prosecution of
that state-court litigation.
Id. at 636 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
161. Cf. Younger, 401 U.S. at 48 (the Court gives a pattern of vexatious criminal
prosecution as an example of irreparable injury).
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under Mitchum if the plaintiff presents circumstances constituting ir-
reparable injury under Younger.
If the statute qualifies as an exception to section 2283 under the Mit-
chum test, the inquiry naturally turns to whether the doctrine of equitable
restraint applies to bar the injunction. Of course, if the federal plaintiff
clears Mitchum by demonstrating that an injunction is necessary to avert
irreparable injury in his case, then the doctrine will not bar his claim.
In addition, if the statute empowers a federal court to stay state judicial
proceedings only in circumstances that would satisfy the Younger stan-
dard in any event, then the issue of equitable restraint will not attain
any independent significance. The provision authorizing injunctions of
pending state-court proceedings in furtherance of federal statutory
interpleader 62 illustrates this point. Interpleader serves as a remedy against
the danger of unnecessary vexation arising from a multiplicity of suits
in respect to a single liability. 16 The plaintiff in an interpleader action
can in no way preserve this remedy by raising a defense in a single state-
court proceeding, and, in fact, the remedy is lost to the extent that the
stakeholder must engage in proceedings in other courts. As the federal
stay provides the only adequate means of preserving this remedy, ir-
reparable injury will always be present and thus equitable restraint should
never operate to bar an injunction in interpleader.
The question of whether the doctrine should apply as a bar will appear
clearly only when a statute authorizes a stay of the state court proceedings
and the federal plaintiff, nonetheless, cannot demonstrate irreparable in-
jury under Younger. In this situation, the same basic analysis developed
above with respect to section 1983 will apply to determine whether Younger
should govern injunctions of state judicial proceedings under the statute.
The fundamental issue focuses upon whether Congress intended for in-
junctions under the particular statute to issue without regard to the state
court's ability to protect the federal right involved. This inquiry will of
course require a determination of legislative intent peculiar to the par-
ticular statute relied upon by the federal plaintiff. Thus, no categorical
statement properly can be made as to whether the Younger doctrine should
apply to all statutes that authorize federal injunctions of pending state
judicial proceedings. Yet, as with section 1983, Younger's irreparable in-
jury standard should apply unless Congress had displaced the underlying
equitable regard for federal-state comity by clearly ordering priorities in
favor of issuance of the federal injunction.'64
162. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 2361 (1976); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 22 (interpleader
under the rule).
163. See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 74
(4th ed. 1983).




The study of federal injunctions of pending state judicial proceedings
begins with the simple proposition that a federal court shall never stay
pending state judicial proceedings.' Over the years, this unequivocal com-
mand has been tempered by judicial improvisation 1 and finally by ex-
press legislative qualification.' Yet, the notion lingers that the Anti-
Injunction Act stands as an absolute bar to the federal stay, operating
without regard to what might result under traditional principles of equity
and comity.16 The practical validity of this notion seems suspect, however.
Whenever principles of equity and comity would authorize the injunction
under Younger, the federal plaintiff will not be turned back by the Anti-
Injunction Act under the Mitchum standard. 169 In fact, the combined rule
of Younger and Mitchum has produced a framework in which a flexible
judicial standard adapted from equity practice, rather than "a clear-cut
prohibition qualified only by specifically defined exceptions," 17 0 actually
governs the circumstances of federal intervention into pending state judicial
proceedings.
This development may not present a model of judicial deference to
the strict letter of the law, but the result ably accommodates the policy
that generated the statutory bar. Section 2283 is founded upon the belief
that "needless friction between state and federal courts"'' will under-
mine the proper functioning of the dual system of courts unless lines of
demarcation between the two systems are developed. 7 ' This concern for
federal-state comity reflects a balanced concept, however, as friction is
"needless" only so long as the state court stands able and willing to pro-
tect the federal right involved. Imposition of a woodenly-applied "clear-
cut prohibition" risks directing federal deference even in situations where
intervention is actually necessary to preserve federal rights. Applying
Younger's irreparable injury standard as the sole test for federal interven-
tion, on the other hand, draws the boundary between the two systems
at precisely the point where federal rights can be preserved without needless
165. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 335 ("I[N]or shall a writ of
injunction be granted [by any federal court] to stay proceedings in any court of a
state . . ").
166. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 1235-36.
167. For the text adopted in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, see supra note 20.
168. See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 639 (1977) (Rehnquist,
J., plurality opinion); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs,
398 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1970).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 152-61. Mere irreparable injury, in its tradi-
tional equitable sense, will not suffice, however. See cases cited supra note 168.
170. Amalgamated Clothinj Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 516 (1955).
171. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940).
172. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S.
281, 286 (1970).
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friction. ' Thus, this delicately-balanced standard serves quite appropriately
as the true basis for supervising federal intervention into pending state
judicial proceedings.
George Sheram King
173. See supra text accompanying note 92.
